Democratization

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Structural or Precondition Theories

Modernization (Lipset)
- Positive relationship between wealth and democracy: Why?
- Literacy
- Urbanization
- Demands of Greater Number of Owners

Middle Class (Marx, Barrington Moore)
- “No Bourgeois, no democracy.” (Moore)

Equality (Aristotle)
- Change in government does not have major distributional consequences
- “oil curse”
- Oligarchy (big landowners) inhibits democracy
- Increasing capital mobility helps democracy (Boix)
Structural or Precondition Theories

Culture
* “Civic Culture” needed (Almond and Verba)
* Some religions, cultures, traditions more conducive to democracy than others (Huntington)

Geography (Kopstein & Reilly)
* proximity to the “West”

Borders (Rustow)
* Must know who is in polity and who is not
* Ethnic Homogeneity
Structures Versus Agents

- Long-Term vs. Proximate Causes
- Preconditions vs. Precipitants
- Environments vs. Actors
- Institutions vs. Individuals
The “Third Wave” Paradigm
(Rustow, O’Donnell & Schmitter, Przeworski, Karl)

- Actors = Elites
  - Splits in Ancien Regime -- Softliners versus Hardliners
  - Moderates versus Radicals (in society)

- Key Ingredient for Successful Transition = Pacts
  - “Limit agenda of policy choice”
  - Share proportionally in the distribution of benefits
  - Restrict the participation of outsiders/radicals in decision-making.

- Equal Balance of Power between incumbents and challengers

- Process Is Cooperative, Non-Zero Sum

- Strategic Interaction Creates Democracy (“democracy without democrats”)
Actors in “pacted” transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Softliners</th>
<th>Hardliners</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderates</td>
<td>Radicals</td>
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</table>
Strategy of Transition

- Pact
- Imposition
- Reform
- Revolution

(Karl, 1990)
Manezh Square, Moscow
March 10, 1991
The “Fourth Wave” Paradigm
(Bunce, Fish, McFaul,)

- Actors = Elites and Masses
- Pact Not a Key Ingredient for Success
- Agenda of policy choice was not limited
  - Distribution of benefits NOT shared proportionally
  - Participation in decision-making not limited to elites
  - Mobilization not a threat to democratization
- Equal BOP not a Necessary Condition for Success
  - Can Be Cause of Conflict
- Process Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero Sum
- You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) “Democrats”
  - Ideas or Ideology Matters
## Paths from Communism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOP in favor of Challengers</th>
<th>Dictatorships</th>
<th>Partial Democracies</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOP Equal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Georgia</td>
<td>Croatia *, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia *, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOP in favor of Incumbents</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Albania, Azerbaijan, Macedonia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>FRY/Serbia</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The Missing Variable in 3rd and 4th Waves: “The International System”

- Bi-Polar System
  - Two Great Powers
  - Heterogeneity of Regimes/Ideologies

- Unipolar System
  - One Pole
  - One Regime Type/Ideology

Multipolar (19th Century)
  - Multiple Poles of Power
  - Heterogeneity of Regimes/Ideologies
Bipolarity/Cold War Constraints on “Third Wave”

- Agenda of Change Had To Be Limited
- Evolutionary Change Necessary
- “Anti-systemic” actors kept out of transition
- Mobilization Dangerous
- Violators Squelched by US and USSR
  - Iran 1953
  - Hungary 1956
  - Czechoslovakia 1968
  - Chile 1973
  - Poland, 1980-81 (even idea of self-limiting revolution did not work)
  - These Cases not Studied in the Third Wave
Unipolarity/Post-Cold War Lack of Constraints on “Fourth Wave”

- Agenda of Change Less Limited
  - Property Rights AND Borders Can Be on the Table

- Evolutionary Change Not Necessary
  - Czechoslovakia 1989
  - Romania 1989

- “Anti-systemic” actors not as feared
  - Liberals in Eastern Europe
  - Communists in South Africa
  - Hamas (2005)?

- Mobilization (in “their” backyard) not as feared
  - Czechoslovakia 1989
  - Serbia 2000
  - Lebanon 2005
Before Arab Spring, I Would Have Argued This:

- Hegemon (U.S.) Supports S.Q.
- Agenda of Change Must Be Limited
- Evolutionary Change Necessary
  - Revival of “Self Limiting” Revolution
- “Anti-systemic” actors must kept out of transition
- Mobilization Feared
- Would Violators Be Squelched by US
- Iran, Russia, China Outliers
<table>
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<th>Softliners</th>
<th>Hardliners</th>
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<td>Secularists</td>
<td>Islamists</td>
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How to Explain Arab Spring?
Agency Theories

- Breakdown of autocracies
- Few pacts (Tunisia, maybe Yemen)
- Mobilization (Egypt, Syria)
- Agenda of Change expansive
  - Liberal vs Islamist ideas
- Quasi ‘anti-systemic’ actors allowed to participate (Islamists, Salafists)
- Deficit of Democrats
- So far, few successful democratic transitions
How to Explain Arab Spring?
Structural Theories

- Low Level of Economic Development
- Culture
  - Muslim religion
  - Arab culture
  - Tribal institutions
- Contested Borders
  - Many multi-ethnic states
- Geo-Politics
  - U.S. (Support for autocrats in name of “stability”)
  - Saudi Arabia vs. Iran (both autocracies)
  - Russia (support for Syrian autocracy)
- Geography
  - No democratic regimes in the neighborhood (Turkey?)
Lowering the Stakes of Transition
(The Incumbent’s Perspective)

- Democracies Can Only Solve Small Problems
  - Not good at solving border issues
  - Property redistribution
  - Slavery
- Agreements on rules of game *before* first election
- Reason why equality helps
- Reason Why Private Sector Helps (where do retired rulers go?)
- Preserving property rights/Reducing Redistributive Taxes
  - Whites in South Africa
  - Red Directors in Eastern Europe
- Keeping some institutions in hands of *ancien regime*
  - Pinochet in Chile
  - Military in Turkey
  - Monarchy: Good for Democracy?
- Constraints on retribution
- Democracy a way to coopt masses/avoid revolution
Raising the Costs of Oppression
(The Challenger’s Perspective)

- Challengers Become Wealthier
- Challengers Not Beholden to State for Employment (USSR, Iran, Singapore)
- Challengers (workers/poor) acquire organizational capacity
  - Resources
  - Strikes/Unions
- Increase Civic Resistance more generally
  - Gandi in India; Orange Revolution in Ukraine
- External Actor Increase Costs
  - Sanctions
  - Intervention
Democratic Triggers?

Defeat in War
Decolonization/Collapse of Empire
External Occupation
Economic Growth
Economic Crisis
Individuals & Ideas
Disaggregating Causes of Collapse of Ancien Regime Collapse from Causes of Democratic/Autocratic Emergence

- “Democratic” Triggers Actually Are Proximate Causes of Ancien Regime Collapse
- What Comes Next Not Determined by Triggers
- Tilly vs Skocpol
Path Dependency

Does Prior Regime Type Influence the Mode or Probability of Democratic Transition?
Conventional Wisdom before 1989

- Authoritarian Regimes Can Democratize (Totalitarian cannot)
  - Private Sector Exists
  - “Resurrection” of Civil Society
  - Restoring democratic institutions
  - Changing “regime” easier than changing whole system
    - Stakes of change too high in commy systems
    - Political and economic power intertwined
The Geddes Typology

- **Personalistic Regimes**
  - Small group relying on state for wealth
  - Who governs after death of dictator?

- **Military Juntas Easier to democratize**
  - Soldiers go back to barracks
  - Old institutions can be revived
    - “Re”democratization easier

- **Hegemonic Party Systems**
  - Have bigger “selectorate”
  - Can withstand crises better than generals, personalistic dictators: cooption
Survivability Rates of Autocracies (1946-1999, from Geddes 1999)

- Military Regimes: 9 years
- Personalistic Regimes: 15 years
- Single-party regimes: 23 years
- Theocracies
  - Islamic Republic of Iran (29 years)
  - Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)
- Monarchies?
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Better Or Worse for Democratization?

- Color Revolutions – Better
  - Serbia 2000
  - Georgia 2003
  - Ukraine 2004

- Russia – Worse

- Middle East?
“Color” Revolutions

- Formal Rules Democratic
  - Elections occur
  - Change of constitution is not necessary for democratic breakthrough
- Regime is Semi-Autocracy
- Precipitant: Falsified Election
- Threat of extra-constitutional actions to restore formal constitutional rules
Precipitants

(1) Semi-Autocratic
(2) Unpopular leader
(3) Rift in security forces

(1) Effective/united opposition
(2) Ability to monitor election
(3) Modicum of independent media
(4) Demonstrations

Ancien regime weakens

Regime Change
“Democratic Revolution”

Societal challengers strengthen
Are Color Revolutions Over?

- Autocrats Have Learned
  - Better at stealing elections
  - Better containing mass mobilization
    - Hong Kong today?

- External Supporters of Autocrats Have Learned
  - Russia
  - Saudi Arabia
Are Pacts Still Possible?

- Requires doing deals with Bad Guys
  - Can it be done in era of “universal values”? (Can you negotiate with Asad?)

- Can Pacts/Secret Negotiations Occur in Era of Twitter?
Different Outcomes, Different Theories

- No One Path to Democracy (Equifinality)
- No Single Theory of Democratization
- Should We Try to Develop a Unified Theory?
- Can We Combine Structural and Actor-Centric Arguments?
Democratic Transitions vs. Democratic Consolidation

The causes of democratic transition are not necessarily the same factors that cause democratic consolidation.
Factors Facilitating Democratic Stability

- Pacted Transitions (Schmitter & O’Donnell)
- Non-Violent Transitions (Ackerman & Karatnycky)
  - The Larger the Peaceful Civic Coalition, the More Probable Democracy
- Levels of Wealth (Przeworski et al)
- Income Equality (Boix)
- Parliamentary Democracy (Linz)
- Ethnic Homogeneity
- Democratic Neighborhoods (Kopstein and Reilly)
- Performance (political and economic) (Diamond)
- Time (Huntington)
Structure vs. Agency

- In the Long Run, Lipset is Always Right
- Lots of Dramatic History in Between
# Wealth and Democratic Stability

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Per Capital Income</strong></th>
<th><strong>Life Expectancy of Democracy</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $1000 =</td>
<td>8 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000-2,000 =</td>
<td>18 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $4000 =</td>
<td>Forever</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(wealthiest subverted democracy: Argentina, 1975, $6,055)
Income and Sustaining Democracy

“...there is no doubt that democracies are more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries. Yet the reason is not that democracies are more likely to emerge when countries develop under authoritarianism, but that, however they do emerge, they are more likely to survive in countries that are already developed.” (Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106)
Why Is Wealth Good for Democracy?

- Performance of Democracy?
- Education Levels Rise?
- Lowers the Intensity of Distributional Conflicts?
New Democracies and Economic Performance

- Life expectancy of democracy with decline in incomes: 19 years
- Life expectancy of democracy with rise in incomes: 64 years
Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems

- Transitions to Dictatorship
  1951-1990

- 39 Presidential Systems
- 13 Parliamentary Systems
- 2 Mixed Systems
Expected Life of Democracies
1950-1990

- Parliamentary Systems: 73 Years
- Presidential Systems: 21 Years
Democracy Is Always a Struggle

- Not an Engineering Problem
- Not the “Natural” Outcome of Economic Development
- Autocrats Rarely Give Up Power without a Fight